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Dr. Goodman-Malamuth is a licensed Marriage, Family and Child Counselor, Speech
Pathologist, and enjoys American Speech and Hearing Association advanced clinical certification as a Speech Pathologist.
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FOREWORD
On October 7, 1977, Dr. Leo Goodman-Malamuth was inaugurated the second President of Governors
State University in Park Forest South, Illinois.
Among the events attendant upon Dr. Goodman-Malamuth's inauguration was an Academic Convocation in which four faculty members read papers reacting to Daniel Bell's article, "The Revolution of Rising
Entitlements." Bell's article had appeared in the April, 1975 issue of Fortune magazine. A University
Committee selected Bell's article as the focus of the Convocation, solicited papers from the faculty and
selected the four included in this booklet from among those submitted. Also included here are the remarks
of the Convocation Chairperson.
Daniel Bell is a professor of sociology at Columbia University in New York City. One of the most
respected sociologists in the country, Bell is co-editor of The Public Interest, associate editor of Daedalus
and is on the editorial board of American Scholar. Among his writings are The End of Ideology (Free Press,
1960), The Radical Right (Doubleday, 1963) and The Reforming of General Education (Columbia University Press, 1966). The American Council on Education awarded Bell its prestigious Borden medal for his
The Reforming of General Education.
"The Revolution of Rising Entitlements" was both a timely and an appropriate choice.
Bell's is not the only voice in these late years of the 1970's to raise the question of "entitlement."
More and more frequently one encounters the cry "reverse discrimination" in conversation, TV viewing and
reading. Businessmen express serious doubts about the survival of free enterprise in a democracy moving
increasingly into "transfer payments." ERA, once a shoo-in in the race toward enactment, stumbles near
the finish line. "Is the U.S. Turning Right?" asks Newsweek.
Symptomatic of the mood, especially for those of us in higher education, is the immense interest
generated by the Bakke case which awaits Supreme Court action as this foreword is penned. Timely,
indeed. Universities have for decades practiced selective admissions. Athletes are tutored as well as subsidized.
Exceptions are made for the sons and daughters of alumni/ae, donors and trustees. Even a "nice regional
mix" can be grounds for exclusion/inclusion.
Strange, that in such an environment, sixteen places reserved for minorities should raise such ire.
A public discussion of Bell's article is especially appropriate for Governors State University. Founded
in 1969, the University is mandated by the State of Illinois to be especially sensitive to the needs of poorer
students and minority students. A senior level institution, Governors State practices open admissions for
any person who demonstrates academic competence at the junior level of college. Although the majority of
students at Governors State are neither poor nor minority, the commitment of the total University community to open access is both long-standing and intense.
As the reader will notice and, by now, may even expect, Bell's article elicited a variety of negative
responses. The authors attack with biting humor, explicit denunciation, scholarly care and deep feeling. The
papers thus provide provocative and delightful reading.
The publication of this booklet is the "final act" of Governors State University's celebration of the
inauguration of Leo Goodman-Malamuth. Many will agree, I feel, that we have saved our "best until last."
Governors State is a regional University and this publication will enjoy a largely regional dissemination. To those of you in this region: we are in many ways "your University." I hope that you will find your
reading of these papers enjoyable, exciting, even profound. You have a right to expect from us this kind of
open discussion of controversial issues. In a very real sense you are, I feel, "entitled" to it.
William H. Dodd
Chairperson, University Inauguration Committee
Governors State University
Park Forest South, Illinois
March 1,1978

INTRODUCTION
By
Paul Green
Daniel Bell is an eminent Harvard sociologist who has written several major books and articles. He
is best known for his 1960 work The End of Ideology which discusses the exhaustion of political ideas
inthe1950's.
His recent essay "The Revolution of Rising Entitlements," the subject of our Academic Convocation, questions past and current relationships between American citizens and their government. He writes:
American society was . . . set apart from others by the belief in material progress.
The industrial revolution and the capitalist order were combined powerfully in
the U.S. and were soon creating a rising standard of living and holding out a tangible promise of plenty for all. Yet the system has been transformed in recent
years and those original impulses are today being caricatured in ways that threaten the stability of American society. The promise of plenty has been transformed
into a revolution of rising expectations. . . . rising expectations for themselves
might in principle, lead people to feel more responsible for the health of their
society. But the expectations in America have become hedonistic, concerned
with consumption and pleasure and lack any moral underpinning.'
Bell raises the crucial issue whether it is the responsibility of democratic government to go beyond
protecting equality of opportunity by insuring equality of result. Moreover, he maintains that not only
has government become the arena where political, social and economic demands are being contested,
but that these demands are today being defined as rights.
Perhaps the difference between equality of opportunity and equality of result can be understood
in terms of a horse race. Equal opportunity means giving the horses in a starting gate the same chance
to run as fast as they can with the swiftest being the winner. Equality of results means that some horses
will be given certain advantages or others certain handicaps in order that all may finish the race at the
same time.
From the outset this country has favored equal opportunity over equal results. Crevecoeur, the 18th
Century French observer of American life wrote, "here the rewards of his [American worker] industry
follow with equal steps the progress of his labor; his labor is founded on the basis of nature, self-interest;
can it want a stronger allurement."
Jefferson's yeoman farmer, Jackson's frontier spirit, Spencer's Social Darwinism, Horatio Alger's
135 novels, Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders, Hoover's rugged individualism all conjure thoughts of Americans asking only the opportunity to prove themselves.
Historian David Potter has written, " . . . the term equality [has] . . . for most Americans exactly
the same connotations which the term 'upward mobility' has for the social scientist."
Abundance in America has allowed some of its people to realize their almost limitless dreams while
others have seen this same abundance cause despair and frustration as they vainly reach for a better life.
According to Daniel Boorstin, " . . . [Americans] suffer [from] extravagant expectations, [they] expect
too much of the world.
Today at this academic convocation we will discuss expectations and entitlements — elitism and
equality. Bell's arguments will be debated, dissected, and cross-examined. Hopefully at the conclusion
all of us will have a better understanding of our own country as well as ourselves.
Finally our participation in this intellecutal experience will reveal two basic truths about American
higher education. First, it will reaffirm our belief that GSU like other major universities is a place of light,
liberty and learning. Second, we will be reminded of a conversation held at the turn of the 20th Century
between Mr. Martin J. Dooley, a fictional, southside Chicago bartender and a Mr. Hennessy, his chief
patron. Their discussion went as follows:

"D'ye think th' colledges has much to do with th' progress iv the' wurruld?"
asked Mr. Hennessy.
"D'ye think," said Mr. Dooley, "tis th' mill Jhat makes th' water run?"5
Footnotes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Daniel Bell, "The Revolution of Rising Entitlements," Fortune (April, 1975).
J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Letters From an American Farmer (New York: t. P. Dutton, 1957), p. 40.
David M. Potter, People of Plenty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 92.
Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide To Pseudo-Events in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 3.
Finley, Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley's Opinions (New York: R. H. Russell, 1901), p. 204.

ENTITLEMENT: ITS BRIGHT SIDE
By

John A. Rohr
The purpose of this paper is to present a concrete example of entitlement and then to analyze Daniel
Bell's article on rising entitlement in light of the example.
The example is Goldberg v. Kelly, an important 1970 case in which the Supreme Court of the United
States created a constitutional entitlement for welfare recipients. At issue in the case was the termination
procedure used by New York City in dropping a recipient from the welfare roles. The procedure was to
provide the recipient with a full evidentiary hearing after the benefits had been terminated. This posttermination hearing involved representation by counsel, oral argument, cross-examination of adverse
witnesses and a written record for possible appeal. In a word, the welfare recipient was entitled to the
ordinary demands of due process after the benefits had been terminated. Before termination, however,
New York provided only a very truncated procedure consisting of notice seven days prior to termination
and an opportunity for the recipient to submit a written statement explaining why the payments should
not be stopped.
The precise constitutional issue was whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
required that New York provide a full evidentiary hearing with oral argument, counsel, and cross-examination before the benefits were terminated. Since the due process clause protects only life, liberty, and
property, it would be necessary for the Supreme Court to find that welfare benefits are "property" if
the due process clause were to apply. The Court did so find. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority
of the Court, held that "much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not
fall within the traditional common-law concept of property." Among these new forms of property is
welfare. As Mr. Justice Brennan put it:
. . . For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food,
clothing, housing, and medical care . . . Thus the crucial factor in this context...
is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may
deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.
Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence,
in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy .
The upshot of the Court's opinion was to create at a constitutional level an entitlement for welfare
recipients to remain secure in the possession of their property until a full evidentiary hearing had taken
place.
Having examined a specific example of entitlement, let us now turn to Bell's attack on "the revolution of rising entitlements." At the outset, let me say that there is much in Bell's article I find distressingly
persuasive. His polemic against our hedonism and loss of belief in our institutions is unexceptionable. It
hurts only because it is true. His skepticism toward the prevailing orthodoxy of man's perfectibility is
welcome and refreshing. His stern insistence on the dangers of egalitarian ideology is no less true because
it is so outrageously unfashionable. His jeremiad against the flaccid sentimentality that masquerades as
principle today may well earn Bell both the reputation and fate of the prophet in his own country.
Despite the obvious strengths of Bell's essay, however, there is one aspect of it that I find inadequate
and that is his attackron "entitlement." Here I find his argument both misdirected and one-sided. Misdirected becuase the real problem that concerns him is the number and degree of benefits conferred rather
than the legal status that protects them; one-sided because he fails to point out the possible advantages
of an expanding entitlement. In the remainder of this paper, I will try to point out some of these advantages — especially judicially created entitlement at a constitutional level.
Goldverg v. Kelly did not increase anyone's welfare benefits but by finding that welfare is property
it did make recipients more secure in whatever benefits they already possess. The same is true of other

cases decided in the past decade in which the Court has found drivers' licenses, garnisheed wages, items purchased on contract sales, and certain forms of public employment to be "property." In these cases the
Supreme Court articulated a new understanding of property — a poor man's "property" that redeemed
this venerable word from its reactionary overtones. In so doing the Court expanded entitlement because
it provided a more solid legal foundation for the retention of certain goods and benefits. This marked a
sharp departure from an earlier era in which courts were wont to distinguish between rights and privileges
with legal protection reaching only the former. The mischief brought about by this distinction can be
seen in a 1941 case that involved an elderly man on welfare whose benefits were terminated because he
insisted on sleeping in a barn which welfare officials deemed unsanitary. The Court rejected his bid to have
his benefits reinstated on the grounds that, since welfare is a privilege and not a right, the government
may condition the privilege on the recipient's compliance with the government's demands that he sleep in
a bed that meets with official approval. A brief quotation from the opinion of the Court reveals the condescending attitude that undergirds the right-privilege distinction:
Appellant also argues that he has a right to live as he pleases while being supported by public charity. One would admire his independence if he were not
so dependent, but he has no right to defy the standards and conventions of
civilized society while being supported at public expense. This is true even though
some of those conventions may be somewhat artificial. One is impressed with
appellant's argument that he enjoys the life he leads in his humble 'home' as
he calls it. It may possibly be true, as he says, that his health is not threatened
by the way he lives. After all he should not demand that the public at its expense, allow him to experiment with a manner of living which is likely to endanger his health so that he will become a still greater expense to the public.
It is true, as appellant argues, that the hardy pioneers of our country slept in
beds no better than the one he has chosen. But, unlike the appellant, they did
it from necessity, and unlike the appellant, they did not call upon the public
to support them, while doing it.
For our purposes, the important point is that had the eccentric old man been paying his own way,
he could have slept wherever he pleased but because he enjoyed the privilege of welfare he had to renounce
the right to sleep in a bed of his choice. The obvious problem with this kind of reasoning is "where does it
stop?" What other rights might a beneficiary of government largess be called upon to renounce in order
to maintain his benefits?
A distressing answer to this question came in the 1960 case, Nestor v. Flemming. Ephram Nestor
was an alien who came to the United States in 1913 and, after many years of hard work, became eligible
in 1955 for Social Security retirement benefits. He and his employers had made Social Security contributions since 1936. From the years 1933 to 1939 Nestor had been a member of the Communist Party.
Years later Congress retroactively made such membership a cause for deportation and further provided
that those deported for having been members of the Communist Party would lose their Social Security
benefits. Nestor was deported in 1956 but his wife remained here. Shortly after his deportation, all payments to his wife were terminated. Litigation ensued and the Supreme Court upheld the government's
position on the grounds that Nestor had "no accrued property right" to the benefits.
Had Social Security benefits been found to be a form of property, Nestor could not have been deprived of them simply because of his departure from political orthodoxy in the mid-1930's.
The essence of the distinction between rights and privileges was expressed with characteristic clarity
by Justice Holmes in an 1892 case that involved a Massachusetts policeman who was fired for publicly
discussing politics contrary to police regulations. The dismissed officer challenged the constitutionality
of the police department's action but Holmes rejected his pleas with the pithy statement that "the petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
The danger of the right-privilege distinction could not be expressed more clearly. Holmes' point was
that because public employment is a privilege, Massachusetts may require its employees to sacrifice such
precious constitutional rights as freedom of speech as a condition of employment. The logic of this argu5

ment is terrifying for it means that through largess government can "buy up" the most fundamental rights
in a free society. While the limited role of government in the nineteenth century kept this danger somewhat
remote, the omnipresent character of contemporary government has transformed it into an imminent peril.
A constitutionally based expansion of entitlement is a necessary defense against the Leviathan of the administrative, regulatory, industrial, post-modern, welfare, warfare state in which it is our lot to spend our
days.
One need only recall the salient role in our economy of government employment, government contracts, government licenses, government grants, government subsidies, and governmentally created monoplies to realize the far-reaching danger of the right-privilege distinction and the consequent need for entitlement to safeguard the dignity, independence, privacy and security of the beneficiaries of governmental
largess. These beneficiaries include not only the poor with their welfare checks but also the businessman
with his government contracts and subsidies, the scholar with his government grants, the professionals
with their government licenses, and the bureaucrats with their government jobs.
If drivers' licenses and garnisheed wages are the property of the poor, government contracts, grants,
and licenses are the welfare of the rich. In the absence of entitlement, all of us — rich and poor alike are vulnerable to the manipulative blandishments of governmental largess. A society in which wealth is
generated through such largess is not necessarily a bad one but if, once so generated, the wealth is held
at the pleasure of the government, it evokes a political nightmare far worse than what Daniel Bell envisions.
It is mass man, bread and circuses. The courts have found that one way to keep government largess from
undermining traditional civil liberties is to assimilate it to property and thereby surround it with entitlements of constitutional guarantees.
Bell is probably right when he underscores the danger of expecting government to give us too much
but no less serious is the danger that what it does give us is not sufficiently protected from an unwholesome
manipulation. Since entitlement is one way to safeguard against this second danger, it is not part of the
problem Bell envisions but instead it is a step toward a solution.
Footnotes
1. 397 U.S. 254(1970).
2. Wilkie v. O'Connor, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 617 (1941).

3. 363 U.S. 603(1960).
4. McAuliffe v. New Bedford 155 Mass. 216, at 220 (1892).
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WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILDREN

By
Roberta M. Bear

Among the arguments Daniel Bell makes against the current and emerging state of affairs are referen'ces to education and child care, to medical and income support programs. He implies that we have put
too many resources into such public programs, and need to cut back.
Consider his description of a 1969 one-day census of institutional care in California: 40% of the state's
population were in institutional care: 8% of the labor force were employed in looking after them. California
appears to be spending uncalled-for amounts of money and manpower on public programs, and it's not
difficult to picture an inefficient bureaucracy engaged in administering these programs. In labeling this
phenomenon a "revolution of rising entitlements," Bell suggests that such programs exist to deal with
personal wants. Who are the 40% in these programs? Bell lists participants in "schools, hospitals, prisons,
old-age homes, and day-care centers." The majority of this 40% of California's population on that day
were children or sick people.
Perhaps we could be more progressive in our treatment of the elderly and the sick, and leave them
in the street to die, or take them up into the hills or out into the desert, or wherever we feel they should
go to meet death without bothering us any more than necessary. In other cultures, such a practice at
least has the dignity of religious ceremony, and developed as a response to the harsh reality of life. I hope
we haven't reached such desperation today in America.
In California on that day, fewer than one in ten gainfully-employed adults was involved in administering public institutional care. Consider the alternative: no schools, no day care, no hospitals. Who would
tend the young and the sick? History tells us: wives and mothers, of course.
Using Bell's statistics, I figure that 30% of California's able-bodied adult population would be involved in caretaking, rather than the 8% he discovered. At least public care is more efficient than the
old way.
But my concern goes deeper: we have yet to create and support the programs we need to meet basic
developmental needs of our nation's children. The logical extension of Bell's argument would be to sacrifice
the little we do offer.
Kenneth Keniston asks, "Do Americans really like children?" He answers in the negative!
In sentiment, we like children; we have a heritage of child-centeredness. But in practice, we do not as
a nation demonstrate that love. Infant mortality is a disgrace; we rank fourteenth, just above Hong Kong.
One-sixth of our children live below the officially-defined poverty line, and one-third below the cut-off
for minimal adequacy. One-third of America's mothers of preschool children are in the labor force, but
our resources to provide safe, adequate care for these children is far behind that of other nations where
mothers typically work outside the home. The issue is not just an economic one. Where are we spending
money? In educational programs for example, we are often damaging young children's personal and interpersonal development. Our schools effectively exclude from any meaningful education some 25% of all
American children. This exclusion occurs in various and subtle ways: children cannot learn what we try
to teach when they are told they will fail because they were born black, or poor, or with a physical handicap, or to parents overwhelmed with their own problems.
I am in sympathy with the concerns Bell expresses. Our free democractic society has not voted for
equal distribution of income and wealth. We should take a hard look at why we haven't tried. Maybe the
information to convince us hasn't been marshaled, or maybe the programs we've tried have been built on
inappropriate foundations.
One thing is clear: we don't really have a choice. As a nation, to not have children is suicidal. To not
support their development is only a slower form of suicide for the nation and for each and every suffering
child. If we don't allocate resources for children in the first twelve years of their lives, we end up spending
it on income support and incarceration in the last 40 or 50 years. Our current situation is not merely
inefficient. More to my point, we are hurting children and children aren't in a position to demand better
treatment.
7

Why don't we in America provide the resources for a safe and developmentally adequate childhood?
In Bell's description of how we've changed from our early good impulses, he cites governmental
assumption in the last forty years of three new responsibilities. Reflect for a moment on the effects of
these programs, or their intended effects, on young children in America.
Programs to curb the depressed economy in the '30s had a potential for increasing the resources
for young children only indirectly, through income support for families; and even that modest potential
hasn't been realized.
The Sputnik-stimulated support of science and technology is part of what Keniston refers to as the
intellectualization of the child, the emphasis on the child as a brain, and the resultant failure to develop
those faculties which allow for tender impulses and noble ideals. A legacy of that 1950's episode of national self-doubt, "Why can't Johnny read, and add, and subtract, and use computers, as well as Ivan?"
has been the development of a disabling educational system, a system which teaches kids how to fail.
It is ironic, of course, that the monster of an educational system we have created should be the model
for the one major attempt to deal directly with the needs of very young children. Among the social programs developed in the 1960's was one committed to providing a Head Start for our nation's deprived
children. Unfortunately, although our impulses were proper, and our goals lofty, we often used children,
and we frequently failed to serve their needs.
Our prime objective now must be to use public funds in the most efficient way possible to materially
implement our humanistic ideals. We cannot not have programs. But we will get out of our medical and
day care and educational programs something more than what we put into them. That "more" will be
more of the mess we have now, unless we genuinely assess and respond to the needs of our children.

OF PROJECTORS AND LEVELLERS: DANIEL BELL'S WHEATLESS ARGUMENT
"Pull up the ladder, I'm aboard."
- Popular translation of the U.S. Marine Corps Motto, "Semper Fidelis."

By
Daniel Bernd
In order to separate the wheat from the chaff in Daniel Bell's Fortune article, let me make my position
immediately clear: there are very few kernels of wheat. And unlike the Commodity Markets, the scarcity
of the product does not increase its value. Professor Bell purports to have discovered something called
"The Revolution of Rising Entitlement," a phrase he uses four times without giving it a clear definition probably because he could not, given his mode of investigation and his treatment of fact.
The burden
of this review is that Bell's article is rhetorically shoddy, historically limited, morally offensive, and interesting only as a symptom of a larger problem.
Bell does give us what we have come to expect in this genre: the obligatory invocation to the sweep
of history, a pious reference to de Tocqueville, and the usual dark reference to a decline in morality.
In order words, the article satisfies the criterion of relentless superficiality cloaked in pseudo-Burkean prose
that marks a Luce publication's excursion into Bigthink.
Bell's thesis can be reduced to the following: Equality is a fine idea as long as people don't think that
they are entitled to it. Or, as Dr. Johnson commented, "It has been observed, that they who most loudly
clamour for liberty do not most liberally grant it.
There is something offensive always in the spectacle of the comfortably fixed discovering that the
extension of equal opportunity to the poor or the children of the poor is aganist Nature. The invention
of invidious racial or class distinctions in order to justify privilege as the unalterable order of things has
been a growth industry since the founding of the Republic. In my lifetime, for example, the Congress
of the United States passed immigration laws restricting Eastern Europeans on the basis of evidence presented to them by Princeton and Stanford professors that such persons (particularly Jews) were naturally
inferior in intelligence and independent spirit. A few years previously an ex-President of the United
States (he had become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court by the time the laws were passed) had led a
vicious letter-writing campaign protesting the appointment of a Jew to the Supreme Court. In other words,
when one's class privileges (however one conceives that class) or the advantages of one's children are perceived to be threatened by notions of equality, restrictive definitions of talent and capacity will inevitably
arise to justify those privileges.
In the special brand of discourse of which Bell's essay affords an example, there is always an appeal to
Civitas, or a "Public Philosophy," as an enjoinment upon those seeking a greater distribution of wealth or
opportunity. What is particularly offensive in Bell is his gratuitous invention of a new pejorative, "revolution of rising entitlement," to cover the natural desire of the persons already running the country to ensure
that they continue to do so. Let us examine one particular passage in Bell to illustrate our point. For
distortion and evasion of the issue, it will serve as sufficiently emblematic of the whole article:
In 1950, spending by government to buy goods and services, and to effect transfer
payments, represented 18 percent of the gross national product. By 1974 the
figure was 32 precent. There is every sign that the proportion will increase steadily, and that major economic decisions in society will turn, necessarily, on the
decisions of government.
In the first place, there is no indication of what he includes under the rubric of "transfer payments."
Secondly, there is no evidence one way or the other that an increase or decrease in transfer payments is
correlated with civic virtue or the decline of morals he earlier asserts.' Third, there cannot possibly be
"every sign" that the trend will increase. Bell doesn't know what all the signs are and neither does anyone
else. Economic prognostication is an erratic science, as we all have had to become painfully aware. The
notion that what is (which in this case is what isn't) must continue, is one of the shoddiest of statistical
tricks. Fourth, there isn't even any evidence that the transfer payments have much to do with rising en-
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titlements. Fifth, it will come as a great surprise to both the President and Congress that "major economic
decisions will turn, necessarily, on the decisions of government." Nothing dependent, of course, upon the
lobbying power of the corporate technostructure. Or upon the Seven Sisters and the OPEC cartel. Or upon
the military/industrial complex. A discreet silence on the influence of corporate power on government
is to be expected in the pages of Fortune.
A more extensive and detailed analysis of Bell's article is not possible in the space allotted me nor
would it serve any particular purpose. There is no need to further break this butterfly upon the wheel.
The danger of Bell's article is that it is too easy to refute or make fun of. We can dismiss Bell, but we
cannot dismiss the problems involved in a free society's efforts to ensure equality and just rewards at the
same time. But much more serious and interesting works exist for us to consider.
We can present a passage from such a work, not only to prove our point, to demonstrate by example
how the problem could be better handled, but also to serve as a reference point for a consideration of
what I perceive to be a larger problem of method and historical conception. The following is from Robert
L. Heilbroner's essay/review of Social Limits to Growth, by Fred Hirsch.

The first half of Social Limits to Growth is devoted to the disappointment
that has accompanied growth as a general social objective. Here Hirsch's argument rests on his distinction between two kinds of output produced by capitalist
(or most socialist) economies. One kind, which he calls material goods, consists
of products whose enjoyments are wholly divorced from the number of persons
who are consuming them. The pleasures of a meal that I eat are in no wise affected by whether or not you are dining as well as I am. There is no reason
why a large number of people cannot enjoy good meals as much as a small number do, or why your purchase of a televsion set should in any way interfere
with the enjoyment I derive from my s e t . . .
Hirsch then depicts a second category, opposed to such goods, which he calls
'positional goods.' Positional goods, as we would imagine, are goods whose individual enjoyments are integrally affected by their degree of general use or
availability. The pleasure I gain from having a house with a view cannot remain
unaffected if all have houses with views, which are then very likely to be views
of one another . . . The advantages of a college degree in competing for jobs
will be vitiated if all have college degrees.
Positional goods, in a word, are goods whose enjoyments depend on the fact
that they are owned by a minority. Conversely, they are goods whose advantages disappear when they are owned by a majority. The analogy . . . is to standing on tiptoe in a crowd. The advantage works for a few but is self-defeating for
all.
. . . we encounter more and more positional consumption as we move away
from societies whose main functions are the satisfaction of primary needs, and
toward societies whose activities engage us in the quest for affluence.
Here Hirsch enlarges an argument first propounded by Sir Roy Harrod in
1958. Harrod pointed out that many of the advantages of being rich lie in the
services that a wealthy person can afford — the bowing and scraping, the personal attention, the special treatment available to him. But these services depend
upon highly unequal income . . .
These advantages of wealth are positional advantages which make wealth a
generalized 'good' that deteriorates with mass distribution. As the lower class
improves its incomes, it will not offer its menial services so readily or so cheaply
. . . In this way the pleasures of wealth steadily diminish with growth. To the
extent that 'being rich' consists in being able to command cheap personal services, it is impossible for a society to enjoy general riches.
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. . . As a society becomes wealthier and more engaged in a positional contest
for consumption, it becomes more difficult, not easier, to arrange for the redistribution of income by government ... In so far as we find ourselves in a worsening competition for the good things of life as we get 'richer,' we become less
willing to relinquish income to the poor, or to give up a portion of our advantages
in access to education, exclusiveness in recreation, neighborhood situation, and
the like.11
Just so. In the light of the above analysis, it becomes clear that what is bothering the persons to whom
Bell's article is addressed is far less the loss of civitas than the loss of positional consumption.
Far more bothersome to me than Bell's generalizations is the method by which he arrived at them. In a
certain sense, people who write like Bell have made us the unwilling victims of their own revolution of
rising entitlement — entitlement to be considered seers, soothsayers, prophets, and recipients of academic
and cultural position. They have brought about their positional advantage by a clever rewriting of Aristotle's
distinction between poetry and history:
It is evident . . . that it is not the function of the poet to relate what has
happened, but what may happen, — what is possible according to the law of
probability or necessity . . . Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a
higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, history
the particular. By the universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on
occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity; and it
is this universality at which poetry aims . . . The particular -- for example what Alcibiades did or suffered.
The problem arises because there is a clear limit to growth in the poetry sector of the economy. The
market cannot absorb all the productions of imaginative literature by those who would like to gain the
positional advantages accruing to authors. And truth to tell, it is not only more prestigious to have the
reputation of a poet (in Aristotle's sense, which covers all imaginative literature: poetry, narrative fiction,
drama), it is a lot more free and more pleasurable. As a poet, one can deal with metaphor, invent characters,
describe reality imaginatively in order to arrive at universal truth, and best of all not be unduly hampered
by fidelity to historical fact.
Thus writers like Bell and many other would-be social critics, along with
the authors of Seed Catalogues and Wall Street Investment Newsletters, can appropriate for themselves
the positional advantages of both sides of Aristotle's equation. One can claim empirical truth with the
necessity of being factual. The writers I am describing give the impression of being unfrocked historical
novelists.
Now such a methodlogy can be justifiable and even useful, as long as we know that what we have
are more or less illuminating metaphors, and not scientific truth. Imaginative constructions of the reality
that could be (Aristotle's preference for the "probable impossibility") can often tell us more than the
piling up of insignificant or inconsequential facts (Artistotle's "improbable possibilities"). Imagination
can instruct as well as entertain, and enables us to understand matters we might not otherwise grasp. But
when imagination disguised as reality is asserted as a basis for decisions of public policy, or as a method
of gaining further positional advantage, we have a right to call it into question. When we think of the
great social myth analysts such as Max Weber and his concept of ideal types, we are sensible of their
great contributions to our understanding of the modern world. The trouble with the minor-league Webers
with which the Academy is afflicted is that, unlike him, they care little about evidence and nothing for
history, except as material to distort. If necessary, they will ease their consciences with the invention of
an epistemology that denies the existence of the factual, or even of history itself.
What is needed is a new vocabularly to describe the field of endeavor of which Bell's article affords
so convenient an example. The reader will notice that I have not used the words "social scientist." I have
no desire to anger any of my audience unintentionally. I propose, instead, to revive the fine old 17th and
18th century use of the word, "Projector." We can adopt the OED's invidious definition, "A schemer,
one who lives by his wits; a promoter of bubble companies; a speculator, a cheat," and follow Jeremy
Bentham's suggestion and restrict its use to "Those, who are distinguished by the unfavorable appellation
11

of Projector." We should also heed the caution of one Featyl (1636), "Let not the Projector pretend
to the publicke good, when he intends but to rob the rich and to cheat the poore.'
The difficulty with the Projector's rewriting of history, or to be fair perhaps, his ahistoricity, is that
it implies that there has not been another view, that the tensions between haves and have-nots have only
arisen since 1960.
We know that the historical roots go much deeper. Although the American and the
French revolutions were essentially bourgeois revolutions, which secured the rights of property, there
have always been those who questioned positional advantage. The middle ages were full of jacqueries and
peasant revolts, led by such men as Guillaume Karle, John Ball, and Wat Tyler, who asked the insistent
question,
When Adam delved, and Eve span,
Who was then the gentlemen?
The revolts were inevitably betrayed and the rebels slaughtered. They did not get to write the
histories. But no matter how much an hierarchical view of "equality" and of the necessities of positional
advantage have been touted by the hired Projectors of the winners, the conflict will out.
Our difficulty is in establishing the context in which the argument over the meaning of Equality can
take place. I would take the position that the range of human possibilities and depth of capacities is very
much greater than the meritocrats claim. As Eric Hoffer said at the Governors State University graduation,
"Ordinary people are lumpy with talent." The considerations of competence cannot even be introduced
until we can be sure that correctable positional advantage is removed as a barrier and a hazard. The point
to make is that the equality is a necessary condition of civitas, a sense of the public good.
But the matter will not be decided statistically. Equality, entitlement, competence, and ability are
not going to be decided by the numbers. We cannot fall prey to the "illusion emboided in the ambition
to attach a single number valuation to complex quantities."'- 1 There is a need, instead, for grounds for
action that can go beyond even our notions of constitutional rights — remember that most of the Founding
Fathers had very little in mind about anything we would call equality. "
As a beginning to the new articulation of a set of principles for the just society, I would like to introduce another set of Founding Fathers, some new heroes, not to replace our present Pantheon, but to supplement it. I suggest we go back to the century before our own Revolution to the English Puritan Revolution; and to that strange and wonderful group known as the "Levellers" - a word applied to them as a
sneer but one which we use as an honorific. The Levellers wanted to unionize Cromwell's Army, on the
grounds that they did not propose to replace King Charles's absolutism with a military tyranny fronting
for the landlord class. Many of them were shot for their presumption, particularly after Cromwell sent
his son-in-law Ireton to deal with them and he reported back that the Levellers were subversive of property rights. It is interesting to note that before Cromwell embarked on his expedition to subdue the
Irish, he had to weed out the Levellers from the ranks of the army because one of them had written that
"the cause of the Irish natives in seeking their just freedoms was the very same with our cause here in
endeavouring our own rescue and freedom from the power of the oppressors.'
It could be our responsiblity to see to it that although the Levellers lost the battles, their spirit can
win the war. "The Levelers can now be seen, not only as having played a major role in their own period,
but as speaking for a popular liberation movement that can be traced right back to the Teachings of the
Bible, and which has retained its vitality over the intervening centuries and which speak to us here with
undiminished force.'
The Levellers' insistence on complete equality does reach across the years since 1649 with a lesson
we could well heed. They too were condemned and slandered for taking equality seriously, but they adhered sturdily to the right. So should we — even in the face of rising entitlement, a phenomenon we should
embrace, not fear.
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Notes and Comments
1.

I have appropriated this comparison from S.I. Hayakawa's review of L. Ron Hubbard's Dianetics, in ETC., The journal
of General Semantics, 1951. Dianetics is the basic scripture of the quackery known as Scientology.

1a. It is true that we can discern what he means by "rising entitlement," even if he does not define it. One is reminded of
the story of the Black physician who tried to register to vote in Mississippi circa 1950. The county clerk administered
a literacy test by handing the physician a newspaper printed in Chinese. The physician's brilliant translation was, "It
says here that there won't be any Blacks voting in Mississippi this year." The smarminess of Bell's approach comes
out in the following: "Clearly the demand for equality now goes far beyond equal opportunity, or protection against
unfair hazards. Too many Americans who got that protection still come out losers. What is now being demanded is
equality of result — and equal outcome for all." Demanded by whom? In what context? By what criteria? Who pays
attention to the demands? Is he talking of a constitutional question (i.e., the Duke Power case)? What distinctions
with what differences is he talking about?
2.

"But the expectations in America have become hedonistic, concerned with consumption and pleasure, and lack any
moral underpinning." How does Bell know this? Based on what evidence? Compared to what people in what period?
What Bell ignores is the possibility that inequality breeds immorality. It seems not to occur to Bell that it is a lot
easier to be kindly, generous, and moral when you have enough money than when you haven't. The central text on
this subject in Western Literature is Bernard Shaw's Major Barbara. It is possible, I suppose, that Bell is unaware of the
demonstration of the crime of poverty in the works of Bernard Shaw and Sean O'Casey.

3.

Samuel Johnson, "Milton," in Lives of the Poets, Vol. I, Oxford World Classics, p. 109. Dr. Johnson was a learned,
intelligent, compassionate, and unselfish conservative — an endangered species in our own times. Johnson was entirely free of class consciousness, and would be appalled at the defenses of plutocracy which our contemporary conservatives emit in the name of his close friend Edmund Burke.

4.

P.B. Medawar, "Unnatural Science," New York Review of Books, Jan. 3, 1977, pp. 13-18. The specific citation is
quoted from Leon J. Kamin's The Science and Politics of IQ. Medawar's article is a classic analysis of how racial,
class, and ideological considerations sometimes bend scientific data. He begins, "If a broad line of demarcation is drawn
between the natural sciences and what can only be described as the unnatural sciences, it will at once be recognized
as a distinguishing mark of the latter that their practitioners try most painstakingly to imitate what they believe quite wrongly, alas, for them — to be the distinctive manners and observances of the natural sciences." (p. 13). I have
named these unnatural scientists "Projectors." See below.

5.

With reference to admission to prestige universities and graduate schools and the self-regarding criteria of quality that
characterizes the educational establishments, see the First Law of Educational Testing, "Whenever the children of
college professors begin to score lower than the first quartile on standardized tests, the tests will change until they do
score in the first quartile." Daniel Bernd, "Minding Our Own Business," Association of Departments of English Bulletin, No. 20, p. 23. For an extended discussion of how this phenomenon exists in the teaching of English in the schools
and in the universities, see Richard Ohmann, English In America: A Radical View of the Profession, Chapter IV, "The
Professional Ethos," pp. 207-254. Ohmann quotes Bernd approvingly but misspells his name. Such is fame.

6.

One task of future scholars is to explain the high reputation of Walter Lippmann. Fred Rodell, a professor of constitutional law at Yale, once issued a challenge to anybody who could cite an original contribution to thought produced
by Mr. Lippmann. As far as I know, the challenge has never been taken up.

7.

One is reminded of opposition to higher wages for workingmen on the grounds that they will just spend it on drink.
Give him a bathtub and he'll just keep coal in it. One speculates that Bell has in mind the study by Richard Easterlin
in The Public Interest (Winter, 1973), "Does Money Buy Happiness?" The answer, is of course, "Not for anybody
who doesn't have any."

8.

"Most of the money the U.S. government spends on transfer payments — Social Security and government pensions
payments — does not represent a redistribution of wealth or income. Instead, these programs in general take money
from middle-income workers so that middle-income retirees may preserve their standard of living (the same can be
said of Medicare). Across the range of social programs — urban renewal, aid to education, day care, Medicaid — tax
money has been 'redistributed' to such oppressed societal victims as real-estate speculators, consulting firms, teachers
and school administrators, landlords, pharmacists, physicians, and nursing-home owners." Jeff Greenfield, "The Absent
Left," Harper's, Sept. 1977, p. 19. As a colleague of mine in the U.S. Office of Education, Bruce Gaarder, once observed of the programs for training teachers of disadvantaged youth that we were then administering "We ought to call
these programs 'New Careers Off the Poor.' "

9.

Skeptics should consult The Control of Oil, by John M. Blair (Pantheon, 1977) and John Kenneth Galbraith's review of
it, "The Refined and the Crude," New York Review of Books, Feb. 3, 1977.
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Anthony Wedgewood-Benn, "Leveller Spirit," The Manchester Guardian Weekly, May 23, 1976, p. 1. Benn is the
Minister of Energy in the British Cabinet and a leader of the left wing of the Labour Party. His address on the Levellers
was given at a memorial service in Burford Churchyard, where three of them were shot in 1649.

22.

Antonia Fraser, Cromwell, Knopf, 1974, p. 312. Lovers of poetic justice (see Aristotle) will be happy to learn that
Ireton died of the plague while on the Irish expedition.

21.

Samuel Adams and Tom Paine did, but they could hardly be called the winners of the American Revolution.

20.

Medawar, p. 13.

19.

For example we can contrast the public uproar about minority admissions to medical schools (the Bakke case), which
columnists like Evans and Novak seem to see as the end of Western Civilization, with the little known fact that the
children of wealthy parents who could not get into medical school on their own and went abroad for their first two
years training are guaranteed transfer to American schools under a Public Health Service Act last year. The medical
schools must admit them or lose federal funds. In other words, if you are rich enough to go abroad (where admission
is much easier) you do not need to worry about admissions. (New Republic, Sept. 3, 1977, pp. 11-12.) The necessary
condition of civitas is a sense of equitable treatment.

18.

Unfortunately, the winners tend to get the best literature on their side also. It would take a strong-minded reader to
prefer Langland (the people's poet) to Chaucer, for example, and one is surprised that Bell does not quote Shakespeare
to support his case. In our times, Marxist critics are performing the vaulable service of redefining the canons of criticism
so as to include authors whom the aristos of literature wish to denigrate as being insufficiently narrow. Cf, John Lucas,
Literature and Politics in the Nineteenth Century, Methuen (London), 1971. The question is not a trivial one. The
teaching of literature has suffered for many years in both England and America from the authors and critics who
insisted that literature of high quality is an upper-class concern only.

17.

Shortly after, we presume, Bell Projected The End of Ideology.

16.

The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 11, p. 2321.

15.

At this point, the shrewd reader is sure to raise the question of what claims the literature teacher involved in political
and social commentary has the right to make. I can only answer that at least we know the difference between figurative langauge and literal descriptions of events. When Burns tells us that "My love is like a red, red rose," we don't
therefore infer that he has sexual designs upon his flower garden. My contention is that reification is a dangerous
game that most of its practitioners don't play very well.

14.

The relation of historical fact to literature is complex, however. Aside from historical personages and historical situations thinly disguised in romans a clef, there is the question of accuracy of portrayal ofacutal persons. One can imagine
what they didn't say but could say (War and Peace, Burr) and one is reasonably satisfied. When the author has the
characters saying and doing things that we know they didn't and couldn't, it is troublesome. (Ragtime, The Public
Burning). Voltaire, in his editorial notes to Thomas Corneille's play about Queen Elizabeth, Le Comte d'Essex, made
the sensible suggestion that authors should write only historical drama about those events many years in the past, so
as to avoid clouding the literary value of the work with partisan reactions. Thus we can be more forgiving of Shakespeare's crass treatment of Joan of Arc in Henry VI because that was long ago, in another century, and besides the
wench is dead. When it comes to Rolf Hockhuth's treatment of Pius XII in The Deputy, we are apt to be less tolerant,
according to partisan feelings.

13.

Arsitotle, The Poetics, trans. S.H. Butcher in Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, 4th ed., Dover, 1951, p. 35.

12.

"The False Promise of Growth," Robert L. Heilbroner, The New York Review of Books, March 3, 1977, pp. 10-12.

11.

Other than the work cited below, we can point to John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971)
and Robert Nozick's rejoinder to it, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 1975) as examples of how really serious
writers grapple with the problem of equality and entitlement.

10.
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"I SUPPOSE YOU SHOULDN'T SAY ANYTHING BAD"
By
Hugh Rank
Paddy Bauler died a few weeks ago. We remember him most vividly as the long-time alderman of the
43rd Ward, a flamboyant saloonkeeper, a picturesque rogue often quoted for his victory statement a
generation ago that "Chicago ain't ready for reform yet." When Bauler died, the Chicago press gave him
front page treatment with several long "human interest" stories recounting Paddy's anecdotes and antics.
Yet, stuck at the end of one of these stories was one of the most memorable political statements ever
made in Chicago. Instead of the usual pro forma remarks about "a passing generation" or "old style politics," George Dunne, the man who took over Richard Daley's job as Cook County Democratic Chairman,
responding to a reporter's question about Paddy Bauler, said: "This man was for many years a public
official and political leader and he never made a constructive contribution in either field. He had a beautiful
son named Harry, a thoroughly decent man who must have taken after his mother . . . I suppose you
shouldn't say anything bad about the dead, but you asked me a question. They'll probaby have to hire
Andy Frain ushers to be his pallbearers." (Chicago Tribune, Aug. 22, 1977)
Certainly one reaction we may have to Daniel Bell's essay is a kind of sadness or embarassment when
someone, who has written so well in the past, later does something so gauche. The same kind of embarassing uneasiness many of us felt during the late '60's as we watched on TV as Hayakawa ranted and raged
in the San Francisco State riots, and found it hard to integrate this with our fond memories of reading
the calm understanding humanist who had written Language in Thought and Action. So also, Daniel Bell's
lucid analyses of general education, liberal education, and the centrality of method linger in our memories,
predisposing us to listen to him; yet many of us who are indebted to Bell's earlier writings must part company here.
I suppose I shouldn't say anything bad about Daniel Bell's essay, but you asked me a question.
If this eassy had been submitted, anonymously, to me as an English teacher, or to many editors, it
would have been rejected outright simply because of its incoherence. By incoherence, I mean that sentences
and paragraphs, although perhaps valid in themselves, simply did not cohere or relate to each other.
But the essay wasn't anonymous. It was written by the person who, a decade earlier in The Reforming
of General Education, recommended that freshman composition be eliminated from colleges because
"one has the right to assume that by the time a student enters college, he can write clearly enough to
make a special course in freshman composition unnecessary."
In a few pages, Daniel Bell rambles through two centuries of political, social, and economic thought,
perhaps in an attempt to be a great historian, one who can look at "the long sweep of the nation's history"
and "identify the salient and enduring factors." If Daniel Bell is trying to do a "de Tocqueville" here, he
has not succeeded. He has let all of the chickens out of the coop at once and they scattered in all directions.
There's no way anyone can catch them all in ten minutes, but at least let me respond to three or four
points which need attention.
One of the problems in analyzing Daniel Bell's scatter-shot essay of "the revolution of rising entitlements" was in determing just what Daniel Bell was trying to say, and to whom.
To whom was he writing? The tone of the essay, the voice and attitude of the author toward the
audience, was as elusive as the content was incoherent. We must presume it was written for the readers of
Fortune magazine, the journal which most epitomizes the establishment in America: the rich, the wealthy,
the entrepreneurs and managers of the capitalist corporate institutions. Throughout this essay Bell is
talking about "materialistic hedonism," yet it is difficult to tell whether he imagines himself to be speaking
in the center of the temple or in the center of a den of iniquity. After all, his audience is the richest, most
materialistic, most hedonistic group of any in the world today. Is he preaching to the sinners or is he
preaching to the saved? It's hard to tell.
It was a lot easier a few years ago when Arnold Toynbee's essay (printed in Advertising Age, Nov. 21,
1973) urged American advertising people to stop wasting their talents. Toynbee, in a voice as strong as
Savonarola, told them quite literally to abandon their jobs as hucksters of soaps and deodorants, and to
dedicate their lives and their creative talents to the betterment of mankind. He used the example of St.
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Francis of Assisi who left his father's business in order to reform the world. Toynbee pointed out that
the modern day heroes of humanity might well come from Madison Avenue. (To note in passing, there
was not a widespread flight from Madison Avenue; very few executives turned in their vested suits for
sackcloth and ashes, and those few who did make a forty day retreat in the desert, went to Palm Springs).
But Toynbee's message was loud, clear, and unambiguous; Bell's message is not.
At the same time that Bell is chastising the materialist, he is parroting the phrases and the corporate
cliches about government interference with business: too much red tape, weffare state, money spent on
social security, Medicaid and Medicare, welfare payments to the poor, and so on.
My main complaint against Bell is that he is an elitist. He is not complaining so much about "materialistic hedonism," but about a new distribution of hedonism. More people are becoming hedonistic.
The main sin that Bell perceives is that more people want to get in on the act. He is really talking about
rising expectations of the poor or of the masses of the people. For example, he says "The promise of
plenty has been transformed into a revolution of rising expectations . . . but the expectations in America
have become hedonistic, concerned with consumption and pleasure and lacking any moral underpinning."
Desire has always existed. Long before the concepts of democracy emerged in the 18th Century,
people desired things, people desired material possessions, people were materalistic hedonists. One needs
only to visit a few museums to view the golden treasures of the Egyptian Pharoahs, the elaborate ivory
sculpture from China and India, the accumulated treasures of European kings and monarchs and popes,
to get some idea of the accumulated wealth possessed by a few people in the past.
Desire is nothing new, but the distribution of desire is a democratic institution. The increasing desires
and expectations of masses of people are most clearly seen in Europe and in America which have had two
centuries of democratic spirit. In the future, we can expect the rest of humanity to follow this example.
Already reports from the Soviet Union and China allude to growing expectations of individuals for the
"hedonistic pleasures" of consumer goods, much to the dismay of party-line purists.
This brings us back to another problem with Bell's essay: he is a purist. And I question one of his
premises. He talks, for example, about a crisis of belief which undermines the legitimacy of our society
today. He talks about a loss of nerve on the part of the establishment and about the population at large
having a feeling of being "let down by leaders." But he concludes this analysis with a statement that "the
major consequence of this crisis is a loss of civitas, that spontaneous willingness to obey the law, to respect
the rights of others, to forego the temptations of private enrichment at the expense of the public weal.
Instead each man goes his own way, pursuing his private voices, while the public weal is forgotten."
I challenge this premise. I think he begs the question: he assumes to be true that which needs to be
proven. He assumes that such civitai once existed in some kind of widespread fashion. I don't doubt that
civitas did exist, and does, among some people: primarily philosophers, idealists and the very young. But
to suggest that somewhere, somehow in a "golden age of the past" such civitas was a widespread human
attitude is an untenable premise. Even in that era of American history where we can think of the most
examples of individuals who had such civitas (the Adams family, Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, the
"Founding Fathers"), even in that era, the distinguishing feature of their political philosophy was the
realism with which they approached the construction of a new government. The intricate check and balance
system was postulated on the fact that people act in their own special interest.
Another section of Bell's essay begs the question by asserting this same illusion of a golden age of the
past, about "rediscovering old virtues." Bell says "What some liberals and some new leftists have rediscovered are the virtues of decentralization and competition." Nothing could please the readers of Fortune more
than to hear Daniel Bell praise the virtues of local government, local institutions and to attack the vast
lopsided growth of federal power. But I find it hard to believe that, in an era when corporations are becoming more centralized, and when even organized crime is becoming more centralized, someone would seriously suggest that we decentralize the one mechanism of the people which could counter-balance such centralization by corporate criminals or by criminal corporations.
For example, there's evidence that the Mafia, or the Syndicate, is a well organized international
criminal conspiracy which does not respect the arbitrarily-drawn political subdivisions in our country.
Such a situation needs to be treated systematically by a national policing organization; one cannot do
this on a local level. For example, should the citizens of Chicago Heights provide funds for an additional
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police officer, or perhaps two, to eliminate the Syndicate's multi-million dollar auto-theft ring which
operates from that area? Or should the citizens of Fairfield, Connecticut (a town about the size of Chicago
Heights), a town which is noted for being the corporate headquarters of General Electric, should the
citizens there be responsible for hiring a police officer to investigate, to see whether GE is price-fixing or
not? Obviously not. These are intricate, complex, national and international problems which demand
some kind of regulation at a national or international level. No one can deny Bell's point that we ought to
"restore the vitality" of local institutions; but, more important, we ought to assess well what is "appropriate for a neighborhood" and what is appropriate for a federal government.
For someone writing about the increase of human desires, Daniel Bell has made an interesting omission
by leaving out any mention of corporate advertising, that part of the business establishment so prominently
involved in stimulating the desires of masses of people for hedonistic pleasures. We have become so accustomed to advertising in our environment that we hardly notice it. Yet, since 1970, the dollar volume
of advertising in the United States has almost doubled from $20 billion to almost $38 billion. Children
who are entering first grade this year have been exposed to $195 billion worth of the most intense persuasion blitz in human history. Yet, Bell says nothing of this, nor does he venture to talk about the creditcard, debt-cycle economy engineered by the American banking institutions and encouraged by everyone
on the Fortune 500 list. This is a serious omission for someone who wants to talk about the problems of
increasing materialism and hedonism. Daniel Bell could have been a bit more specific about their particular
role in amassing wealth themselves, and through advertising and business practices, in stimulating and
encouraging others.
Bell does not come closer to clarity in his closing paragraphs which seem vague, even contradictory,
and which conclude with a client about "learning from the past." After reading this essay a few times, I
don't quite know what Daniel Bell wanted to say. It could be my fault, but it might be his too.
However, other writers, such as the economists E. F. Schumacher (in Small is Beautiful) or Barbara
Ward (the "Haves" and "Have-nots") can rather clearly articulate some of the problems involved in the
revolution of rising expectations, especially in the developing nations of the Third World. Perhaps part of
their clarity of expression comes from their clarity of values.
Daniel Bell tells us, vaguely, that there must be "some agreed-upon principles that can enable us to
differentiate between needs and 'wants' ." But Schumacher and Ward are more specific in pointing out
some of these principles: for example, that it is unjust and immoral for one nation with 6% of the world's
population to consume most of the world's goods and to use most of the world's energy to sustain a luxury
economy for a small portion of that nation's people. Bell says, rather timidly it seems, "we need a way to
define the common good." Others have more forcefully stated that the common good includes certain
minimum standards of living for all people - adequate food, clothing, and shelter - and certain minimum
environmental standards. But the reality of all of these specific concerns for the "common good" is that
they imply major change in the distribution of wealth.
Perhaps Daniel Bell didn't want to say anything bad to his Fortunate readers. But they did ask him
a question. And I think they would have received a tougher answer from a Toynbee, a Ward, or a Schumacher. But Fortune does not favor the bold.

In the discussion following the presentations, Professor Rank noted the very recent death of E.
F. Schumacher, and quoted from the economist's most recent book (A Guide for the Perplexed)
published earlier that week: "The generosity of the Earth allows us to feed all mankind: we know
enough about ecology to keep the Earth a healthy place; there is enough room on the Earth, and
there are enough materials, so that everybody can have adequate shelter; we are quite competent
enough to produce sufficient supplies of necessities so that no one need live in misery. The problem
is not economic but moral."
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also from the University of Chicago. He has taught at the University of
Illinois, Chicago Cirlce, at the Chicago Police Academy and at Loop College.
Green came to Governors State in 1973.
He has published several articles in law enforcement and political science
journals. In January of this year Illinois Issues published his "The New
Geography of Illinois Politics," co-authored with fellow Govenors State
University Professor, Peter Colby.
Green is married, has two children and lives in Park Forest South, Illinois.
A final note - in April, 1977, he was elected Monee Township Supervisor.

John A. Rohr has been a University Professor of Public Administration
in the College of Business and Public Service since the opening of Governors
State University in 1971. He holds a doctorate in political science from the
University of Chicago as well as graduate degrees in philosophy and theology
from Loyola (Chicago) and Georgetown Universities.
Rohr is a frequent lecturer on the ethics of public administration at
conferences sponsored by the United States Civil Service Commission's
Management Training Center in Washington, as well as at the Commission's
regional offices in Chicago, Philadelphia and St. Louis and its Executive
Seminar Centers in Kingspoint, New York and Oakridge, Tennessee. His
articles and review have appeared in Public Administration Review, Review
of Politics, Thought, Theological Studies, Good Government, Chicago Studies,
and many other scholarly and popular publications. His latest book, Ethics
for Bureaucrats: An Eassy on Law and Values, is scheduled for publication
in the summer of 1978.

Hugh Rank was educated at Notre Dame University. He has taught at
Arizona State University, St. Joseph's College (Indiana) and Sacred Heart
University (Connecticut). He has been a Fulbright Professor in Copenhagen,
Denmark. Rank's books include The American Scene (1969); The U.S.A. A Commentary (1972); Edwin O'Connor (1974); and Language and Public
Policy (1974).
Since 1972 Rank has been deeply involved in the analysis of commercial
and political propaganda and he works actively with the National Council
of Teachers of English, Committee on Public Doublespeak. In 1976 he was
presented with the Committee's George Orwell award for his "distinguished
contributions to honesty and clarity in public language." Rank's "Intensify/
Downplay" technique for analyzing propaganda has been endorsed by the
Committee on Doublespeak and has been printed in several textbooks during
the past year. He is currently preparing a book manuscript on the analysis
of propaganda.
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Daniel Bernd grew up in Kansas City, Missouri and Lincoln, Nebraska,
served in the United States Air Force during World War II and the Korean
War, was educated at Stanford University (Philosophy), Indiana University
(East European Area Studies), and the University of Nebraska, from which
he holds a Secondary Teaching Certificate in Social Studies and a Ph.D. in
English. He taught at the University of Nebraska, the University of Michigan,
California State University (Northridge), and spent two years managing
teacher education programs in the United States Office of Education before
coming to Governors State University in 1970, where he teaches English
Literature and Intellectual History and is Co-director of the Liberal Education Center.
He has written a textbook in dramatic literature and has published in such
journals as The New Republic, Prairie Schooner, The Journal of Teacher
Education, Swimming World, and Faze I. His entitlement "consists of spending his time reading books and journals and talking about them with his
students and colleagues; and writing memoranda and position papers informing the academic community on the nature of the good, the true, and
the beautiful."

Roberta Meyer Bear is a 1967 Ph.D. graduate of the Committee on Human
Development, University of Chicago. An undergraduate psychology major
(B.A., Mills College, 1963), she concentrated on early child development as
a graduate student and as a USPHS Research Trainee.
While a graduate student, she also worked on the Cognitive Environments
of Urban Preschool Children study, investigating maternal and home influences on a child's readiness for education. With Robert D. Hess she co-edited
a collection of pioneering papers published in 1968 as Early Education
(Chicago: Aldine). Bear held a faculty appointment in the Early Education
Research Center at the University of Chicago when the first of her three
children was born in 1968.
In 1975 Bear joined the Urban Teacher Education program in the College
of Human Learning and Development of Governors State University. She is a
University Professor of Early Childhood Education. She has developed a
curriculum to train prekindergarten teachers. The curriculum emphasizes a
normative developmental approach to integrating broad-spectrum handicapped children with normal preschoolers in non-categorical classrooms.
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